ethics concerns what it is appropriate to do, we must firstly reflect on what it is to do something. Secondly we must give some thought to what it means to consider something as appropriate, and thirdly we will have to address what we mean, when we say 'we'. I hope by this to make clear, not only what bio-ethics is, but also how or why it is relevant, and to what extent.
First reflection on ethics: What it is to do something
We can do something in two ways:
1. Either by coincidence, as when we have made a mess of something and did not plan to do it; 2. Or we can do it deliberately, as when we purposefully try to achieve it.
In fact these two ways of doing something are complementary parts of any act because it is impossible in fact, but not in theory, to separate what we want to do from what we actually manage to do. We can also say that this is because doing, (involving intention and choice), is always doing something (the reality of what is done).
It is generally thought that we have moral responsibility only for what we intend to do, i.e. what we do deliberately, whereas we have legal responsibility also for what we actually manage to make of it, i.e. what we do by coincidence. In reality, however, our actions aren't made up exclusively of our intentions, nor would they be our actions if we did not intentionally bring them about. When we do something, we have chosen to do it, but 'it' might turn out quite differently from what we expected, because 'it' is not only dependent on our intentions, but also on what comes of it. There is no doing without the combination of intention and achievement. For example: I didn't intend to hit the pedestrian, when I drove to work. What I was doing was precisely 'to go to work', but it also happened that I hit a pedestrian. If I merely had intended to drive to work, I would never have got into the car. But driving on its own wouldn't have got me there either. I must carry the legal responsibility for what I in fact did, and the moral responsibility to the extent that the accident was my fault. Quite likely what I intended to do, and was justified in expecting I could do, was something entirely other than what in fact came out of it. Yet it wouldn't have happened, if it hadn't been for my intention. The 'principle of double effect' relies on this distinction between what is intended and what is obtained. It also is this distinction which accounts for the distinction between ethics and law.
2. Secondly, we consider something appropriate locally, when we think its maxim is fit for acceptance by all involved, 'within the house', for example, or 'within the scientific community'. 3. Thirdly, we consider something appropriate generally, when we imply that its maxim 'ought to be' accepted by all as a general law, and hence could not justifiably be prohibited as a maxim for actions. This is the 'missionary' dimension of considering something appropriate, which it is impossible to avoid.
In fact these three ways are three dimensions of any consideration of something as appropriate, because any act of any kind can be appreciated by everyone, even if it should not always be. Private ethical decisions, therefore, can, in so far as others feel concerned by them, have social and universal dimensions. As we are born into a house, a family, a tribe, a group or a society, we grow up with the knowledge of what is and what it is not considered appropriate to do within these communities, and we have to take our own stand in relation to them. When we do so, we contribute to their development, because we contribute to them what we consider to be appropriate. Hence we are by our very actions and thoughts ethical decision-makers. This is why the three dimensions of considering something appropriate cannot be separated even as they remain distinct.
Third reflection on ethics: What we mean when we say 'we'
Because of the inseparability of the three dimensions of considering something appropriate, it is of the essence of ethics, what we mean when we say 'we'. When we by the term 'we' refer merely to the majestic plural of myself, we might be granted right of way.
For example when what we claim is either just, in the interest of those whom it concerns, or simply establishing a sorely needed order with authority. If neither of these is the case, we will be regarded as tyrants, madmen or egoists. When we, however, by the term 'we' refer to our local community, it means that we have taken the interests and points of view of every member of the community into consideration before we formulate what 'we consider to be appropriate'. Finally, when we by the term 'we' refer to the universal community, we should in principle have considered the claim we make from every possible angle. We learn gradually to refer to this 'we', as we have to take on political responsibility and are made to ponder the damage caused to some by a mere local use of 'we'.
It seems to be up to us who we are. When we say: 'we know that it is wrong to kill a human being' we refer, by the expression 'we', either to the majestic 'we', to the local 'we', or to the universal 'we'. The 'we' we can justifiably refer to empowers us to speak in its name and invests us with its power. We can, however, usurp this power by pretending to speak in its name. This is when we don't really take into consideration what others think, but pretend to do so in order to lend our claim more credibility. In a certain sense, saying 'we' always includes the pretension to speak for more than one self, and hence it is sometimes pretentious. We can refer to a pretended 'we' and 'get away with it' to the extent that those who disagree don't voice their disagreement. We leave others free to speak in our name as long as it is not vital for us that other people know we think otherwise, or as long as we are not able to make our claim heard. What 'we' consider appropriate is therefore not beyond the power-balance of a given society, only what is good, is. Problems of ethics, in fact, are always what you could also call 'social' problems.
The ethical problem is built into all communication and all knowledge, because we have to speak as 'we' all the time. 'We know that the earth is round' for example, is a rallying of all of us, to know that the earth is round. 'We don't accept breaches of human rights' is a call to all of us not to accept breaches of human rights. These propositions are both proposed for us to accept. But they exemplify two types: those that concern what is, and those that concern what to do. In general discourse the types are interwoven to the point of inseparability. But when one engages in arguing, disentangling them becomes necessary and the means by which a community, so to speak, reconstitutes itself. In so far as the argument is about what to do, it is ethical in nature, and what the community reconstitutes by its negotiations is its ethics.
One way of structuring a debate about ethics is to discuss our 'ethical principles'. Ethical principles are proposals of general rules for life in common. The 'golden rule': 'do unto others as you would like them to do to you' is probably the ethical principle most commonly appealed to. It is expressed in Kant's Categorical Imperative. The utilitarian principle of acting purposefully to promote 'the highest degree of happiness for the greatest possible number', is also a commonly accepted standard. Various theories of what acting well means (egoism, authoritarianism, natural law theory, ethics of care, and virtue theory) can be discussed to clarify what we mean. This helps ease frustration because it makes us more capable of contributing our own point of view in a constructive way.
Bio-ethics
Bio-ethics, i.e. what we consider appropriate to do in relation to the biosphere -whether in our bodies, in our sharing of it, or in our natural habitat -is negotiated in the same way as ethics generally is. It concerns our doings in relation to the biosphere; it concerns what we consider it appropriate to do, in its private, social and universal dimension; and it depends on how we identify as 'we'. It has been discussed very much recently because technology has confronted us with choices for which there is no well established precedence. Also: the consequences of these choices seemed to concern everyone: From IVF to GMO's, bio-ethics concerns all because the biosphere is one and the same for everyone, even if it is vast.
There are some signs that bio-ethics already has peaked in Europe. After a decade of difficult and public negotiations of private, social and international matters -some of which Ireland might face unwillingly in the near future -humiliations and triumphs have evened out, and the general feeling that life is not perfect, and that our decisions aren't either, has taken over. Other problems, moreover, have taken centre-stage since the eleventh of September 2001. The most disturbing ethical problem we will have to deal with in the near future is xenophobia.
This is not to say that the bio-ethical problems aren't important any longer. They have to be addressed to the extent that it is necessary, i.e. to the extent that they are controversial. There are generally speaking three institutional ways of facilitating the 'restoration' of the ethics of a society: by education, by politics, and by law.
Education is a long-term investment, but is also very flexible and very durable. Courses taught on an interdisciplinary basis have the advantage of creating a semi-permanent interdisciplinary forum for dialogue, which in the long run is the best way of assuring a competent response to emerging social problems in relation to the biosphere. A lectureship in bio-ethics has been set up in NUI, Galway in 2000 4 , and a chair at the Dublin Molecular Medicine Center (TCD and UCD) in 2001. Medical ethics has been taught in medical schools for a number of years. The literature available as teaching material is virtually infinite, even if of varying quality.
The political facilitation of the restoration of ethics includes the establishment of ethical committees. Given that NUIM has launched its degree in biotechnology, it is probably necessary to establish one here, in so far as potential investors, funding agencies and publishers might require or request it 5 . It might also be a wise precaution to take, in order to address problems that could arise in the public. Its composition, tasks, mode of convocation, expected output and responsibility is, however, to consider very carefully, even as it must comply with varying standards set out by funding agencies 6 . The Royal Irish Academy has proposed the establishment of a National Ethics Advisory Body, in negotiations with the Ministry for Enterprise, Trade and Employment 7 . Such an advisory body could complement existing standard-setting authorities, and could serve as an important outlet for ethical tensions as well as contributing on a long-term basis to international debate 8 . Its mandate would also have to be considered carefully, as the creation of a 'bio-ethical magisterium' can provoke resentment 9 . Political initiatives in the form of committees exist also at the international level: in EU, The Council of Europe and Unesco 10 . They are what must be called 'trend setting' because they formulate the politically viable compromise between industry and the public.
The international documents relating to bio-ethics also are trend setting, if not legally binding. The most important of these is the Council of Europe Bioethics Convention and its additional protocols 11 . EU directives relating to patenting, etc. likewise are of great importance, as national legal development in the member states is significantly supported by them. Up until now, however, it seems as if bio-ethical legislation in Ireland has been concerned with setting up various agencies of a regulatory nature 12 and hence preserved a flexibility, which of course might be tested in the future.
Conclusion
What I have hoped to show is that bio-ethics, being what we consider it appropriate to do in relation to the biosphere, concerns what we do, what we consider appropriate, and who we are. Therefore it involves everyone and forms an indispensable part of social integration of any society affected by biotechnology. I also hope to have indicated the means by which such integration is facilitated, in teaching, politics and law. And finally I hope to have made you aware of your role in this integration process. 
